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I. INTRODUCTION 
Terry Takewell died in his home on September 17, 1986 after a 
hospital administrator dumped him in the parking lot outside of 
Methodist Hospital in Somerville, Tennessee.1 Mr. Takewell had 
suffered from diabetes for several years.2 The day before he died, Mr. 
Takewell’s neighbors found him suffering from acute ketoacidosis.3 His 
neighbor, Mrs. Zettie Mae, sent Mr. Takewell to his doctor, who then 
ordered him to go to the emergency room immediately.4 Mr. Takewell 
arrived at the hospital by ambulance.5 Later that day, a hospital 
administrator came to Mr. Takewell’s bedside, picked him up in his 
                                                                                                             
 1 House Subcomm. on Human Resources & Intergovernmental Relations, Equal 
Access to Health Care: Patient Dumping: Hearing on H.R. REP. NO. 531 Before the 
House Subcommittee on Human Resources & Intergovernmental Relations, 100th Cong., 
2d. Sess. 11 (1988) (statement of Zettie Mae). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. Ketoacidosis is a complication of diabetes caused by the buildup of ketones, 
which are by-products of fat breakdown. Medline Plus, Diabetic Ketoacidosis (2006), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000320.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2007). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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arms, carried him out of bed, and walked him out of the hospital.6 The 
administrator left Mr. Takewell in the parking lot without shirt or shoes.7 
During Mrs. Zettie Mae’s testimony at the House Subcommittee on 
Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations hearing, she stated 
that Mr. Takewell told her that the hospital refused him care because he 
had no health insurance and because he still owed the hospital for 
previous medical treatment.8 A community organization in Tennessee 
later filed a Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(“COBRA”) complaint with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) against Methodist hospital.9 The Tennessee State 
Board of Licensure investigated the situation, and found the hospital in 
compliance with state and federal law.10 The Board did not even threaten 
the hospital with the slightest sanction that it could apply.11 
American common law historically did not provide patients like 
Mr. Takewell with a legal right to medical treatment, and likewise did 
not impose on hospitals an obligation to provide treatment.12 This lack of 
a legal duty, however, when combined with the rising costs of medical 
care, resulted in “patient dumping.”13 In particular, “[t]he act of patient 
dumping occurs when patients [who seek care] in an emergency 
department are denied emergency medical care or stabilizing treatment 
based on economic or noneconomic grounds, such as race, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, or contraction of a socially unacceptable disease.”14 
Simply put, patient dumping is the act of refusing medical treatment to 
patients who are unable to afford it. 
Prior to the 1986 passage of the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”),15 many reports detailed the frequency 
                                                                                                             
 6 House Subcomm. on Human Resources & Intergovernmental Relations, Equal 
Access to Health Care: Patient Dumping: Hearing on H.R. REP. NO. 531 Before the 
House Subcommittee on Human Resources & Intergovernmental Relations, 100th Cong., 
2d. Sess. 11 (1988) (statement of Zettie Mae). 
 7 Id.  
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Hardy v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792–93 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“EMTALA was enacted to fill a lacuna in traditional state tort law by imposing on 
hospitals a legal duty (that the common law did not recognize) to provide emergency care 
to all.”). 
 13 Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 14 Thomas A. Gionis, Carlos A. Camargo, Jr. & Anthony S. Zito, Jr., The Intentional 
Tort of Patient Dumping: A New State Cause of Action to Address the Shortcomings of 
the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 52 AM. U. 
L. REV. 173, 175–76 (2002). 
 15 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, P.L. 109–208 (2000). 
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and effects of patient dumping. One report found that almost eighty-
seven percent of hospitals that transferred patients admitted that the 
patient’s lack of health insurance was the only motivation for transfer.16 
Another report showed that more than seventy-two percent of transferred 
patients required emergency medical treatment at the receiving 
hospital.17 Hospitals would refuse to treat patients who could not provide 
proof of insurance or an alternative method of payment.18 Thus, hospitals 
were denying care to indigent patients or were transferring patients to 
another health care facility, oftentimes resulting in worsened medical 
conditions, or, as in Mr. Takewell’s case, even death.19 
In response to the perceived crisis of patient dumping, Congress 
passed EMTALA in 1986 as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act.20 EMTALA is far-reaching legislation that requires 
all hospitals that receive federal monies, generally through their 
Medicare and Medicaid programs, to provide some limited care to every 
patient who seeks treatment in the emergency department.21 EMTALA 
applies to any person seeking emergency treatment in a hospital, but its 
foremost impact is on people with little or no health insurance who could 
otherwise not afford health care.22 Although Congress intended to 
alleviate the problem of patient dumping through its passage of 
EMTALA, interpretation of the statute has created splits in the courts of 
appeals. 
Unfortunately, Congress, at times, used vague statutory language 
when drafting EMTALA,23 causing courts to diverge in their 
interpretations of the statute.24 In particular, the circuits are split over 
three issues. First, the circuits are split over what constitutes an adequate 
medical screening; the First and Ninth Circuits require an objectively 
                                                                                                             
 16 Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Karen I. Treiger, 
Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA’s Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 
1190–91) (1986)). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See Michael J. Frank, Tailoring EMTALA to Better Protect the Indigent: The 
Supreme Court Precludes One Method of Salvaging a Statute Gone Awry, 3 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 195, 195–96 (2000). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 21 Kristine Marie Meece, The Future of Emergency Department Liability After the 
Ravenswood Hospital Incident: Redefining the Duty to Treat?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 101, 103–04 (1999). 
 22 Cooper v. Gulf Breeze Hosp., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1538, 1540–41 (N.D. Fla. 1993). 
 23 For example, the statute entitles “any individual” to an “appropriate” medical 
screening examination. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). 
 24 Caroline J. Stalker, Comment, How Far is Too Far? EMTALA Moves From the 
Emergency Room to Off-Campus Entities, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823, 829 (2001). 
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reasonable standard,25 while the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. 
Circuits hold hospitals to a subjectively reasonable, or nondisparate 
treatment standard.26 Second, the circuits are split over whether 
EMTALA’s provisions apply after a hospital initially stabilizes a patient 
and later admits the patient to the hospital;27 the Sixth Circuit holds that 
EMTALA still applies after initial stabilization,28 while the Ninth Circuit 
holds that a hospital’s EMTALA obligations end upon admittance as an 
in-patient.29 Third, the circuits are split over how to interpret EMTALA’s 
requirements.30 The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the 
conjunctive approach, by treating the statute’s three provisions as 
interdependent and sequential requirements,31 while the First Circuit 
follows the disjunctive approach, interpreting EMTALA as creating two 
distinct causes of action: one for the medical screening requirement and 
another for the stabilization requirement.32 To clarify issues surrounding 
EMTALA, the Department of Health and Human Services, now referred 
to as the CMS, promulgated interpretative regulations, coined “the Final 
Regulations” in 2003.33 The Final Regulations succeed in resolving some 
divisive issues among the circuits, but leave open for debate several other 
pertinent EMTALA issues. 
The Final Regulations address three important issues over which 
the circuits have split.34 First, the Final Regulations appear to promote a 
subjective standard for the medical screening requirement, dependent on 
each individual patient’s condition.35  Second, the Final Regulations 
clearly state that “a hospital’s obligations under EMTALA end once an 
                                                                                                             
 25 See Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1193 (1st Cir. 1995); Eberhardt 
v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 26 See Brian E. Kamoie, EMTALA: Reaching Beyond the Emergency Room to 
Expand Hospital Liability, 33 J. HEALTH L. 25, 37 (2000). 
 27 Dana E. Schaffner, Note, EMTALA: All Bark and No Bite, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1021, 1032 (2005). 
 28 See Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 29 See Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys. West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 30 See Gionis, supra note 14, at 264. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See Medicare Program, Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of 
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals With Emergency Medical 
Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53222, 53222 (Sept. 9. 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. Parts 413, 
482, and 489). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(adopting a subjective, non-disparate treatment standard); see also Summers v. Baptist 
Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996); Repp v. Anadarko Mun. Hosp., 43 
F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994); Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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individual is admitted for inpatient care.”36 Third, the Final Regulations 
address the conjunctive versus disjunctive issue by asserting that 
EMTALA liability is triggered in one of two ways: (1) “The individual 
can present at the hospital’s dedicated emergency department and request 
examination or treatment for a medical condition;”37 or (2) “the 
individual can present elsewhere on hospital property (that is, at a 
location that is on hospital property but is not part of a dedicated 
emergency department), and request examination or treatment for an 
emergency medical condition.”38 Therefore, the Regulations can be 
interpreted to support both the conjunctive and disjunctive approaches. 
These interpretations beg the question of whether the circuit courts must 
give deference to the Final Regulations. 
Despite the release of the Final Regulations, courts will still face 
issues of statutory interpretation regarding EMTALA, and in such cases, 
courts will be guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.39 First, a court 
must ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.”40 If Congress has spoken directly to the issue, “the court gives 
effect to the statute’s plain meaning, obviating any need to decide 
whether or not to defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation.”41 A 
court need not give deference to an agency’s interpretation if Congress’ 
intent is entirely clear.42  However, if “the court determines Congress has 
not directly addressed the precise question at issue,” the court must ask 
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”43 Where Congress’ intent is not entirely clear, a court must 
defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation that is permissible.44 
The Regulations articulate a subjective standard, requiring that a 
medical screening be “provided to each individual commensurate with 
the condition that is presented.”45 Because the Regulations articulate a 
                                                                                                             
 36 See Medicare Program, Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of 
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals With Emergency Medical 
Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53222, 53247 (Sept. 9. 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. Parts 413, 
482, and 489). 
 37 Id. at 53243 (emphasis added). 
 38 Id. (emphasis added).  
 39 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 40 Id. at 842. 
 41 Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 532, 541 (2000). 
 42 Id. at 542. 
 43 Id. at 587. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Medicare Program, Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of 
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals With Emergency Medical 
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subjective, nondisparate medical screening requirement, an interpretation 
clearly in line with Congress’ intent, the Regulations deserve Chevron 
deference. Moreover, because Congress’ intent is clear as to protecting 
patients even after a doctor initially stabilizes and admits them, courts 
need not accord Chevron deference to the Regulations as far as they limit 
liability under EMTALA when a hospital admits a patient as an inpatient. 
Finally, because EMTALA’s plain language and its legislative history 
both clearly reflect Congress’ intent, courts should not afford Chevron 
deference to the Regulations, insofar as the Regulations construe 
EMTALA liability conjunctively and require that a patient who presents 
on hospital property apart from a dedicated emergency department 
“request examination or treatment for an emergency medical condition”46 
in order for EMTALA protection to attach. 
This comment argues that the Final Regulations to EMTALA do 
little to clarify hospitals’ obligations under the statute, but instead leave 
circuits to analyze the Regulation’s applicability under Chevron. 
Furthermore, because Congress’ intent as to EMTALA was clear, this 
comment argues that courts need not give deference to the Final 
Regulations. Part II considers first EMTALA’s background and 
legislative history, in order to elucidate Congress’ intent in passing the 
statute. It next examines the judicial ambiguity that has surrounded the 
statute since its inception in 1986. In particular, it focuses on three 
divisive issues over which the circuits have been split. It also examines 
the Final Regulations promulgated by the CMS in 2003 and the 
Regulations’ effect on the judicial splits. Part III examines how the 
circuits should interpret the Final Regulations, following a Chevron 
analysis of the Regulations’ applicability. Part IV concludes that 
Congress enacted EMTALA with the clear purpose of preventing 
hospitals from denying emergency medical treatment to under- and 
uninsured patients because of their inability to pay. To further this 
purpose, courts should give Chevron deference to the Final Regulations 
in certain circumstances, while in other instances, Chevron deference 
clearly would be inappropriate. 
                                                                                                             
Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53222, 53236 (Sept. 9. 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. Parts 413, 
482, and 489). 
 46 Id. at 53243 (emphasis in original). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. EMTALA’s Legislative History 
Congress enacted EMTALA “in response to a growing concern 
about ‘the provision of adequate emergency room medical services to 
individuals who seek care . . . .’”47 In particular, Congress was concerned 
“about the increasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms 
[were] refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if 
the patient [did] not have medical insurance.”48 Patient dumping resulted 
in inadequate or nonexistent treatment that ultimately led to an increase 
in morbidity and mortality rates.49 
Furthermore, “[i]t is undisputed that the impetus to [EMTALA] 
came from highly publicized incidents where hospital emergency rooms 
allegedly . . . failed to provide a medical screening that would have been 
provided a paying patient . . . .”50 Congress’ purpose for passing 
EMTALA was clear, in that it sought to prevent hospitals from turning 
away without treatment patients with emergency conditions because of 
their inability to pay.51 Thus, Congress’ intent was unmistakably clear: it 
intended to eliminate patient dumping by prohibiting the disparate 
treatment of patients based on factors such as their economic or 
insurance status. Congress enacted EMTALA to protect patients from 
hospitals that provided them with an inadequate medical screening exam 
in an attempt to cut costs. 
Congress passed EMTALA with the unequivocal and clearly stated 
purpose of preventing patient dumping.52 In particular, the Committee 
Report from the House of Representatives indicates that Congress was 
concerned primarily that patients who sought emergency medical 
treatment and whose doctors failed to stabilized them were not obtaining 
adequate care, if any at all.53 One Committee Report stated that “[t]here 
                                                                                                             
 47 Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
H.R. No. 241, pt.III). 
 48 Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors Univ. Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996) (citation 
omitted). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990); 
see also 131 Cong. Rec. S13, 892-01 (1985) (statements of Sens. Durenberger, Kennedy, 
Dole, Baucus, Heinz, and Proxmire emphasized that EMTALA stemmed from the widely 
publicized scandal of emergency rooms that were ever increasingly removing indigent 
patients from one hospital and dumping them onto the next while patients’ emergency 
medical condition worsened.) 
 51 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt.1, at 27 (1985) as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
595. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id.  
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have been reports of situations where treatment was simply not provided. 
In numerous other instances, patients in an unstable condition have been 
transferred improperly, sometimes without the consent of the receiving 
hospital.”54 Furthermore, “[n]eeding a carrot to make health-care 
providers more receptive to the stick, Congress simultaneously amended 
the Social Security Act, conditioning hospitals’ continued participation 
in the federal Medicare program—a lucrative source of institutional 
revenue—on acceptance of the duties imposed by the new law.”55 
Congress, therefore, used its legislative powers to eliminate patient 
dumping. 
B. EMTALA’s Statutory Provisions 
Hospitals that provide Medicare and Medicaid services have a duty 
under EMTALA to provide to patients who present in an emergency 
department an appropriate medical screening examination and stabilizing 
care.56 Moreover, hospitals may not, under most circumstances, transfer 
medically unstable patients.57 EMTALA has two main requirements: (1) 
a medical screening requirement; and (2) a stabilization or transfer 
requirement.58  In addition, a violation of EMTALA carries with it strict 
penalties for both hospitals and physicians.59 
1. Medical Screening Requirement 
EMTALA’s medical screening requirement gives little guidance as 
to its true meaning.60 EMTALA provides that: 
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency 
department, if any individual . . . comes to the emergency 
department . . . for examination or treatment for a medical 
condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical 
screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s 
emergency department . . . to determine whether or not an 
emergency medical condition . . . exists.61 
                                                                                                             
 54 Id. 
 55 Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1189–90 (1st Cir. 1995); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a–b), (e)(2) (1986). 
 56 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(c). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(1)(A)–(B). 
 60 Gerald A. Williams, How You Could Get Nailed for Patient Dumping, Med. Econ., 
Apr. 13, 1998, at 189. 
 61 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (emphasis added). 
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If, after an appropriate medical screening, a hospital determines that 
no emergency medical condition exists, the hospital has satisfied its 
EMTALA duties.62 If, however, the hospital determines that an 
emergency condition in fact exists, the hospital has a duty under 
EMTALA to either stabilize the patient’s condition or to transfer the 
patient to another hospital for further treatment.63 
The statute does not define an “appropriate medical screening 
examination,” and the law gives limited guidance in determining what 
constitutes an adequate exam.64 To satisfy EMTALA’s screening 
requirement, a hospital need only apply a screening process to all 
patients in a nondisparate manner, such that a hospital does not provide 
differing levels of care to patients based on such factors as economic 
position or race.65 Furthermore, a hospital cannot delay the screening to 
determine a patient’s insurance or financial status.66 Accordingly, the 
statute requires a hospital to examine an individual to assess whether a 
medically emergent condition exists, regardless of that individual’s 
ability to pay.67 
EMTALA defines an emergency medical condition as one 
“manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity . . . such that 
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected 
to result in placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy, 
serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any 
bodily organ or part . . . .”68 Additionally, the term “emergency medical 
condition” also applies to a woman in active labor if “there is inadequate 
time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital before delivery, or that 
transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or unborn 
child.”69 Thus, “an emergency medical condition exists only if a patient 
is in imminent danger of death or a worsening condition that could be 
life threatening”70 or is in excruciating pain.71 
                                                                                                             
 62 See Kamoie, supra note 26, at 29. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Williams, supra note 60, at 189. 
 65 See Kamoie, supra note 26, at 27. 
 66 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). 
 67 Id., Kamoie, supra note 26, at 27. 
 68 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 505, 511 (N.D. Ohio 1993), aff’d, 48 
F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 71 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A). 
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2. Stabilization Requirement 
Stabilization of patients is EMTALA’s second requirement.72 This 
requirement is triggered when a hospital assesses a patient and 
determines that an emergency medical condition exists.73 EMTALA then 
requires that a hospital “provide either (A) within the staff and facilities 
available at the hospital, for such further medical examination and such 
treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or (B) 
for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance 
with subsection (c) of the section.”74 Stabilization requires either that “no 
material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable 
medical probability,”75 or for a woman in active labor, that she deliver 
both the child and placenta.76 
The statute allows a patient with an emergency condition to be 
transferred to another hospital if the patient, after being informed of the 
hospital’s duty of care and the risks associated with transfer, requests 
such a transfer in writing or a doctor provides a certification that the 
medical benefits of another facility outweigh the risks of transfer.77 Thus, 
under the language of EMTALA, specifically subsections (b) and (c) and 
the definition of “stabilized” established in subsection (e), a physician 
may transfer a patient to another hospital without a certification and 
without the consent of the receiving hospital if the physician reasonably 
believes that the transfer will not result in a “material deterioration” in 
the patient’s condition.78 Transfer of a stabilized patient, therefore, does 
not implicate EMTALA.79 
Hospitals are thus required only to provide an appropriate 
screening, applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, to the extent needed to 
determine if an emergency medical condition exists.80 If a healthcare 
provider determines that an emergency condition is not present, a 
hospital satisfies EMTALA with the completion of the medical 
screening.81 If an emergency condition does exist, the hospital is 
                                                                                                             
 72 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4)(B). 
 76 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (1998). 
 77 42 U.S.C. § 13955dd(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 78 Cherukuri v. Shalala, 175 F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Decanda M. Faulk, EMTALA: The Real Deal, 16 A.B.A. SEC. THE HEALTH 
LAWYER 70 (2003). 
 81 Id. 
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obligated to stabilize or transfer the patient to satisfy EMTALA’s 
requirements.82 
3. Penalties 
Hospitals and physicians who fail to adhere to EMTALA’s 
statutory requirements face serious financial and legal penalties.83 In 
particular, hospitals and physicians may face fines, exclusion from 
Medicare funds, as well as civil liability from private patients.84 The 
CMS and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) each have the power 
to enforce the EMTALA statute, and penalize statutory offenders.85 
The CMS and OIG may impose on a hospital found to have 
violated an EMTALA provision a civil fine of up to $50,00086 and may 
also fine a physician who negligently violated the statute.87 Additionally, 
repeated and flagrant statutory violations may result in the exclusion of 
the hospital and its physicians from the Medicare program.88 This is 
significant, for according to one author, “the real economic weapon of 
this legislation is not the $50,000 fine but, rather, the fast track 
termination from Medicare.”89 Furthermore, a hospital’s public image “is 
likely to be significantly damaged when announcements in local 
newspapers read that ‘the hospital is an immediate and serious threat to 
patient care and will be terminated from Medicare.”90 
Moreover, EMTALA provides an extra incentive to comply with its 
provisions: hospitals (though not physicians), can be subject to private 
suit by a patient for a statutory violation.91 To state a viable claim, a 
plaintiff must prove that she went to an eligible hospital’s emergency 
department, sought treatment for an emergency condition, and the 
hospital either failed to provide an adequate, nondiscriminatory 
screening, or the hospital discharged or transferred the plaintiff before 
stabilizing her condition.92 Furthermore, “to prove a violation of 
EMTALA’s screening provisions, a plaintiff need not prove that she 
                                                                                                             
 82 Id. 
 83 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(1)(A)–(B). 
 84 Id. 
 85 St. Anthony Hosp. v. HHS, 309 F.3d 680, 693 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 86 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A). “A participating hospital that negligently violates a 
requirement of [EMTALA] is subject to a civil money penalty of not more than $50,000 
(or not more than $25,000 in the case of a hospital with less than 100 beds) for each such 
violation.”  Id. 
 87 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). 
 88 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1). 
 89 Mikel A. Rothenberg, Emergency Medical Malpractice 1.11 (1994). 
 90 Id. 
 91 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). 
 92 Brenord v. Catholic Med. Ctr., 133 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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actually suffered from an emergency medical condition when she first 
came through the portals of defendant’s facility; the failure appropriately 
to screen, by itself, is sufficient to ground liability as long as the other 
elements of the cause of action are met.”93 
Congress enacted EMTALA to curb the growing practice of patient 
dumping. EMTALA requires that a hospital provide a medical screening 
to each patient, and if that patient is in an emergency condition, the 
hospital must stabilize the patient. If a hospital fails to properly screen or 
stabilize a patient, both the physician and the hospital face stiff penalties. 
Unfortunately, however, Congress used vague statutory language when 
drafting EMTALA, which has led to varying interpretations, as well as 
circuit splits over interpretation, among the federal circuit courts. 
C. Conflicting Interpretations from the Circuits  
Since EMTALA’s inception, federal circuit courts have interpreted 
the statute with a lack of uniformity.94 Abundant, contradictory case law 
dealing with the statute reflects this judicial ambiguity.95 The circuits 
have differing views concerning EMTALA’s language and specific 
requirements.96 
First, the circuits are split over what constitutes an adequate 
medical screening; the First and Ninth Circuits hold hospitals to an 
objectively reasonable standard,97 while the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, 
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits, hold hospitals to a subjectively reasonable, 
or nondisparate treatment standard.98 Second, the circuits are split over 
whether EMTALA’s provisions should apply after a hospital initially 
stabilizes a patient, in accordance with the statute, and later admits the 
patient to the hospital;99 the Sixth Circuit holds that EMTALA’s 
requirements still apply after initial stabilization,100 while the Ninth 
Circuit holds that a hospital’s EMTALA obligations end upon admitting 
a patient.101 Finally, the circuits are also split over how to interpret 
EMTALA’s requirements.102 The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
                                                                                                             
 93 Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1190 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 94 Compare Correa, 69 F.3d at 1189–90 with Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 
Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 95 Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Correa, 69 F.3d at 1193; Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 
1257 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 98 See Kamoie, supra note 26, at 37. 
 99 See Schaffner, supra note 27, at 1032. 
 100 See Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 101 See Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys. West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 102 See Gionis, supra note 14, at 264. 
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follow the conjunctive approach, by which courts treat the statute’s three 
provisions as interdependent and sequential requirements.103  The First 
Circuit, however, follows the disjunctive approach, and interprets 
EMTALA as creating two distinct causes of action: one for the medical 
screening requirement and another for the stabilization requirement.104 
Furthermore, since Congress enacted EMTALA in the 1980s, two key 
cases have interpreted the statute broadly, and thus have expanded the 
possibilities for hospitals’ and physicians’ liability.105 
1. Split over the Medical Screening Requirement 
The first division of the circuits concerns what exactly constitutes 
an adequate medical screening under EMTALA’s provisions.106 The 
problems arising from the screening requirement surround the use of the 
word “appropriate.”107 As one court proffered, “‘[a]ppropriate’ is one of 
the most wonderful weasel words in the dictionary, and a great aid to the 
resolution of disputed issues in the drafting of legislation.”108 There is no 
real consensus among the circuits as to what satisfies EMTALA’s 
requirement of an “appropriate medical screening examination.”109 A 
minority of the circuits, including the First and Ninth Circuits, has 
adopted an objectively reasonable standard, one that requires more from 
a hospital and its physicians and also adds a reasonableness requirement 
to EMTALA.110 Conversely, a majority of the circuits, including the 
Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, has adopted a 
subjective, nondisparate treatment standard.111 
                                                                                                             
 103 Id. at 265–67. 
 104 Id. at 268–70. 
 105 Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 251 (1999) (per curiam); Lopez-Soto 
v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 106 The First and Ninth Circuits apply an objectively reasonable standard to 
EMTALA’s medical screening requirement, while the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, 
and D.C. Circuits apply a subjective, non-disparate treatment standard. 
 107 See Frank, supra note 18, at 206. 
 108 Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 109 See Frank, supra note 18, at 205. 
 110 See Roberts, 525 U.S. at 252; see also Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 
1184, 1193 (1st Cir. 1995); Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
 111 See Kamoie, supra note 26, at 37; see also Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271; Summers v. 
Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996); Repp v. Anadarko Mun. 
Hosp., 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994); Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 
2002); Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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a. Objectively Reasonable Standard 
The First and Ninth Circuits form a minority of circuits that require 
hospitals and physicians to meet an objectively reasonable standard with 
regards to EMTALA’s medical screening requirement.112 Under this 
standard, “[a] hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patients in its 
emergency room if it provides for a screening examination reasonably 
calculated to identify critical medical conditions that may be afflicting 
symptomatic patients and provides that level of screening uniformly to 
all those who present substantially similar complaints.”113 The First and 
Ninth Circuits thus join to form a minority of circuits that hold hospitals 
and physicians to an objectively reasonable standard with regards to 
EMTALA’s medical screening requirement, and together have attempted 
to create a “national standard of emergency care.”114 
The plaintiff in Correa arrived at the hospital’s emergency room 
complaining that she felt sick and had chest pains.115 The defendant 
hospital did not follow its own standard procedures requiring that a 
hospital employee check the vital signs of every patient entering the 
facility.116 The court held the hospital liable because the “delay in 
attending to the patient was so egregious and lacking in justification as to 
amount to an effective denial of a screening examination.”117 Thus 
Correa reflects the First Circuit’s promulgation of a reasonable standard 
with which a hospital must comply to satisfy EMTALA’s screening 
requirement.118 
In Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, the plaintiff’s son presented in 
the hospital’s emergency room, where a physician examined and then 
released him.119 After his release, police shot and killed the plaintiff’s 
son after he yelled “kill me.”120 The plaintiff sued the hospital for failing 
to provide a medical screening evaluation and claimed that if a physician 
had done so, the hospital would have detected her son’s suicidal 
tendencies.121 The Ninth Circuit stated that a “screening examination is 
‘appropriate’ if it is designed to identify acute and severe symptoms that 
alert the physician of the need for immediate medical attention to prevent 
                                                                                                             
 112 See Correa, 69 F.3d at 1193; Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1257. 
 113 Correa, 69 F.3d at 1192.  
 114 See Frank, supra note 18, at 207. 
 115 Correa, 69 F.3d at 1188. 
 116 Id. at 1193. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See Stalker, supra note 24, at 831. 
 119 62 F.3d 1253, 1254–55 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 120 Id. at 1255. 
 121 Id. at 1257. 
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serious bodily injury.”122 The court held that because the plaintiff’s 
suicidal tendencies were neither acute nor severe the defendant hospital 
was not liable under EMTALA.123 
b. Nondisparate Treatment Standard 
In contrast, a majority of the circuits, in particular the Sixth, Eighth, 
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, has adopted a subjective standard to 
judge the screening requirement.124 The subjective standard requires that 
a hospital screen, examine, and treat its patients in a nondisparate manner 
within that hospital’s individual capabilities.125 These courts look to 
legislative intent and to the plain language of EMTALA in determining a 
subjective standard for an “appropriate medical screening 
examination.”126 
The Sixth Circuit held in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 
Inc., that “appropriate” requires a hospital to provide each patient with 
“care similar to care that would have been provided to any other patient, 
or at least not known by the providers to be insufficient or below their 
own standards.”127 Specifically, the Cleland court determined that a 
hospital complies with EMTALA’s medical screening requirement “[i]f 
it acts in the same manner as it would have for the usual paying 
patient.”128 Thus, the court found for the defendant hospital because, 
although the plaintiff “had a condition that was at least conceivably 
ascertainable by medical science, the condition was not ascertained, and 
he died within 24 hours,” there was “not the slightest indication that this 
outcome would have been any different for a patient of any other 
characteristics.”129 
The Eighth Circuit in Summers v. Baptist Medical Center 
Arkadelphia arrived at a similar interpretation of the statute’s medical 
screening requirement with a focus on nondisparate treatment.130 The 
                                                                                                             
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 1258. 
 124 See Kamoie, supra note 26, at 37. 
 125 See, e.g., Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 
1990). 
 126 Id. at 268. 
 127 Id. In this case, the plaintiffs took their son, who suffered from cramps and 
vomiting, to the hospital’s emergency room. Id. at 269. The boy was examined, 
diagnosed with influenza, and four hours later was discharged from the hospital. Id. The 
next day, the boy died after suffering from cardiac arrest. Id. 
 128 Id. at 272. 
 129 Id. at 271. 
 130 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996). In this case, the plaintiff presented in the defendant 
hospital’s emergency department after falling out of a tree stand while deer hunting. Id. at 
1135. The plaintiff complained of back and chest pains and stated that he heard a popping 
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court stated that EMTALA entitled a patient, “not to correct or non-
negligent treatment in all circumstances, but to be treated as other 
similarly situated patients are treated, within the hospital’s 
capabilities.”131 The Summers court went further in its analysis and stated 
that “EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute and it does not set a 
national emergency health care standard; claims of misdiagnosis or 
inadequate treatment are left to the state malpractice arena.”132 Thus the 
Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the First and Ninth Circuit’s position, 
which favors the creation of a national standard governing emergency 
medical care.133 
The Tenth Circuit in Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital agreed 
with the majority of the circuits that EMTALA “is neither a malpractice 
nor a negligence statute,”134 and that EMTALA “precludes the adoption 
of a standard tantamount to a federal malpractice statute.”135 
Furthermore, the court held that EMTALA “does not require a hospital to 
provide a medical screening in the abstract, but one that is appropriate 
within the capability of the hospital’s emergency department, including 
ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department.”136 
Therefore, the court proffered that “the statute’s requirement is hospital-
specific, varying with the specific circumstances of each provider.”137 
The Eleventh Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning in Harry 
v. Marchant.138 The court in Harry reiterated the majority consensus that 
                                                                                                             
noise every time he breathed. Id. The emergency room physician ordered x-rays of the 
plaintiff’s spine, but not his chest. Id. The spinal x-rays showed only a previous break, 
and the plaintiff was discharged. Id. Two days later, the plaintiff was in so much pain that 
he went to another hospital where, upon x-raying his chest, the doctor discovered a 
broken breastbone and rib. Id. at 1135–36. The plaintiff’s principal claim against the 
hospital was for its failure to “provide for an appropriate medical screening examination 
within the capability of [its] . . . emergency department.”  Id. at 1136. 
 131 Id. at 1138. 
 132 Id. at 1137. 
 133 See Stalker, supra note 24, at 833. 
 134 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). In this case, the patient 
presented in the hospital’s emergency department suffering from pain in his arm. Id. at 
521. A hospital employee gave the patient two injections and discharged him. Id. The 
patient went home and died in his sleep that night. Id. Plaintiffs sued the hospital for 
violating EMTALA by not providing the patient with an appropriate medical screening 
examination. Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)). 
 137 Id. 
 138 291 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2002). In this case, the patient presented in the hospital 
emergency room, where she was first seen by the defendant, Dr. Marchant. Id. at 768. 
The doctor diagnosed her with “pneumonia rule out sepsis”, id., and requested permission 
from the on-call attending physician to admit the patient into the intensive care unit 
(“ICU”). Id. The attending physician refused to authorize the transfer. Id. Later, the 
patient’s primary care physician examined her, admitted her to the ICU, and prescribed 
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Congress did not intend EMTALA’s screening requirement to be used as 
a medical malpractice claim.139 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit again 
echoed the majority of the circuits by defining an appropriate medical 
screening examination in terms of nondisparate treatment, such that a 
hospital is required to treat all similarly situated patients in the same 
manner.140 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit recognized an analogous medical 
screening requirement in Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 
finding that “what constitutes an appropriate screening is properly 
determined not by reference to particular outcomes, but instead by 
reference to a hospital’s standard screening procedures.”141 Therefore, 
according to the D.C. Circuit, “a hospital fulfills the ‘appropriate medical 
screening’ requirement when it conforms in its treatment of a particular 
patient to its standard screening procedures. By the same token, any 
departure from standard screening procedures constitutes inappropriate 
screening in violation of [EMTALA].”142 
EMTALA’s medical screening requirement has split the circuits. 
The minority of the circuits, including the First and Ninth Circuits, 
follow an objectively reasonable standard. This standard requires that a 
hospital provide its patients with a screening examination “reasonably 
calculated to identify critical medical conditions that may be afflicting 
symptomatic patients and provides that level of screening uniformly to 
all those who present substantially similar complaints.”143 In contrast, the 
majority of the circuits, including the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits, follow a subjective standard. The subjective standard 
requires that a hospital treat each patient in a nondisparate manner, 
within the individual capabilities of that hospital.144 Unfortunately, in 
addition to the statute’s medical screening requirement, EMTALA’s 
stabilization requirement has also created a circuit split. 
                                                                                                             
her antibiotics. Id. at 768–69. The ICU nurse never administered the antibiotics, and the 
patient died that afternoon after lapsing into respiratory and cardiac failure. Id. at 769. 
 139 Id. at 773. 
 140 Id. at 774. 
 141 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In this case, the plaintiff’s husband 
presented in the defendant hospital’s emergency room “complaining of pain radiating 
down his left arm and into his chest.”  Id. at 1039. A hospital physician examined Mr. 
Gatewood “and performed blood tests, a chest x-ray and an EKG test.” Id. Both the 
resident and attending physicians diagnosed Mr. Gatewood with musculoskeletal pain 
and discharged him. Id. Mr. Gatewood died of a heart attack the next morning. Id. 
 142 Id.  
 143 Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
 144 Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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2. Split over EMTALA’s Stabilization Requirement 
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits take opposing positions over 
EMTALA’s second requirement concerning patient stabilization.145 A 
hospital triggers the statute’s second provision, the requirement to 
stabilize a patient, only after a hospital screens a patient and determines 
that an emergency condition exists.146 Thus, EMTALA’s stabilization 
requirement does not apply if a hospital performs an appropriate 
screening and finds no emergency medical condition.147 The circuits 
disagree, however, over whether EMTALA’s provisions should apply 
after a hospital initially stabilizes a patient, in accordance with the 
statute, and later admits the patient to the hospital.148 
a. In the Sixth Circuit, EMTALA Applies After Initial Stabilization 
In the Sixth Circuit, courts have held that EMTALA’s provisions 
apply after a physician initially stabilizes a patient.149 In Thornton v. 
Southwest Detroit Hospital, the Sixth Circuit found that a patient who 
had been admitted as an in-patient to the hospital for three weeks still 
had a claim against the hospital if her emergency condition was not 
stabilized upon discharge.150 The Thornton court focused on EMTALA’s 
language and legislative history, and stated that “[a]lthough emergency 
care often occurs, and almost invariably begins, in an emergency room, 
emergency care does not always stop when a patient is wheeled from the 
emergency room into the main hospital.”151 Thus, the court held that 
“[h]ospitals may not circumvent the requirements of the Act merely by 
admitting an emergency room patient to the hospital, then immediately 
discharging that patient. Emergency care must be given until the 
patient’s emergency medical condition is stabilized.”152 Although it 
found the hospital was not liable because the patient’s condition had 
been stabilized prior to discharge, the court stressed that its holding was 
not based on the patient’s prolonged in-patient status, but rather on the 
fact that there existed no issue of material fact concerning whether her 
condition was stabilized upon her release.153 
                                                                                                             
 145 See Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990); Bryant v. 
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b. In the Ninth Circuit, EMTALA Liability Ends Upon Admittance 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit held in Bryant v. Adventist Health 
System that EMTALA’s “stabilization requirement normally ends when a 
patient is admitted for inpatient care.”154 The Bryant court focused on 
EMTALA’s definition of “stabilized” and the fact that “the term is 
defined only in connection with the transfer of an emergency room 
patient,”155 to conclude that “the term stabilize was not intended to apply 
to those individuals who are admitted to a hospital for inpatient care.”156 
The court recognized that the Fourth Circuit followed the same approach, 
and it noted the Sixth Circuit’s differing conclusion.157 The Bryant court 
supported its decision by stating that “Congress enacted EMTALA ‘to 
create a new cause of action, generally unavailable under state tort law, 
for what amounts to failure to treat’ and not to ‘duplicate preexisting 
legal protections’”158 and “[a]fter an individual is admitted for inpatient 
care, state tort law provides a remedy for negligent care.”159 Thus, if 
“EMTALA liability extended to inpatient care, EMTALA would be 
‘convert[ed] . . . into a federal malpractice statute, something it was 
never intended to be.’”160 
The circuits disagree over whether EMTALA’s requirements apply 
after a hospital initially stabilizes a patient, and later admits the patient to 
the hospital. The Sixth Circuit has held that a hospital remains liable 
under EMTALA even after the hospital admits the patient as an 
inpatient.161 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that a hospital satisfies 
                                                                                                             
 154 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). In this case, the plaintiffs took their minor 
son to the defendant hospital’s emergency room because he had been coughing up blood 
and had a fever. Id. at 1164. The boy was severely disabled and had a history of asthma, 
bronchitis, and pneumonia. Id. The hospital physician ordered a chest x-ray, but failed to 
notice a large lung abscess. Id. The physician diagnosed the boy with pneumonia and 
asthma, prescribed an antibiotic, and discharged him. Id. Later that day, the hospital 
called the family, told them they had discovered the abscess, and instructed them to 
return to the hospital  Id. Three days later, the boy was transferred to another hospital and 
later was released. Id. The boy died suddenly and unexpectedly a few weeks later. Id. His 
parents sued, claiming the hospital violated EMTALA’s stabilization requirement by 
failing to diagnose the boy’s emergency condition and discharging him before stabilizing 
the condition. Id. at 1163. His parents further alleged that after they returned to the 
hospital and the boy was admitted for inpatient care, the hospital “again violated 
EMTALA’s stabilization requirement by failing to stabilize his condition during the three 
days after it admitted him for treatment.”  Id. 
 155 Id. at 1167. 
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 157 Id. at 1168. 
 158 Id. at 1168–69 (citation omitted). 
 159 Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys. West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(citation omitted). 
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 161 Thornton v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990). 
2007] EMTALA: Protecting Patients First 169 
its statutory requirements, and thus EMTALA liability no longer applies, 
after the hospital admits a patient.162 Unfortunately, however, the 
provisions over which the circuits are split do not end there. 
3. Split over a Conjunctive or Disjunctive Approach 
The final circuit split concerns the issue of how to read EMTALA’s 
three requirements of a medical screening examination, stabilization, and 
transfer, set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(c), either conjunctively or 
disjunctively.163 The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the 
conjunctive approach, by which courts treat EMTALA’s three provisions 
as interdependent and sequential requirements.164 In contrast, the First 
Circuit follows the disjunctive approach, and interprets EMTALA as 
creating two distinct causes of action: one for the medical screening 
requirement and another for the stabilization requirement.165 
a. The Conjunctive Approach 
Under the conjunctive interpretation of the statute, only patients 
who present in a hospital’s emergency room are subject to EMTALA 
protection.166 Thus, the threshold issue according to this approach is 
whether a patient arrived in a hospital’s emergency room.167 
Accordingly, hospitals are relieved of EMTALA liability after they admit 
a patient as an in-patient to the hospital. The Fourth Circuit concluded, 
therefore, in Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 
that “the stabilization requirement was intended to regulate the hospital’s 
care of the patient only in the immediate aftermath of the act of admitting 
her for emergency treatment . . . . “168 Thus, EMTALA “cannot plausibly 
be interpreted to regulate medical and ethical decisions outside that 
narrow context.”169 
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 164 See Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors Univ. Va., 95 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1996); 
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 169 Id. at 352. 
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 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit supported a conjunctive approach in 
James v. Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center.170 In James, the court 
read all three of EMTALA’s requirements together.171 From this 
approach, the court concluded “the transfer restrictions of 42 U.S.C. § 
1395dd(c) [ ] apply only when an individual ‘comes to the emergency 
room,’ and after ‘an appropriate medical screening examination,’ ‘the 
hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical 
condition.’”172 
The Eleventh Circuit in Harry also followed the conjunctive 
approach and limited EMTALA’s stabilization requirement to patient 
transfers.173 The court reasoned that EMTALA “is logically structured to 
set forth two options for transferring a patient with an emergency 
medical condition: a hospital must either provide stabilization treatment 
prior to transferring a patient pursuant to subsection (A), or, pursuant to 
subsection (B), provide no treatment and transfer according to one of the 
statutorily recognized exceptions.”174 The court listed the elements of a 
stabilization requirement claim: “(1) the patient had an emergency 
medical condition; (2) the hospital knew of the condition; (3) the patient 
was not stabilized before being transferred; and (4) the hospital neither 
obtained the patient’s consent to transfer nor completed a certificate 
indicating the transfer would be beneficial to the patient.”175 
b. The Disjunctive Approach 
The First Circuit adopted the opposite approach and views 
EMTALA’s requirements in the disjunctive.176 In Lopez-Soto, the First 
Circuit set forth its disjunctive argument by stating that “subsections (a) 
and (b) of EMTALA operate disjunctively rather than conjunctively.”177 
Under that interpretation, the court allowed the parents of an infant who 
                                                                                                             
 170 James v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 86 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the 
plaintiff was admitted to defendant hospital with acute renal failure. Id. at 886. The 
hospital “inserted a synthetic graft into her arm,” which caused her “pain and numbness 
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was born and subsequently died in the operating room to sue under 
EMTALA’s stabilization and transfer requirements.178 The court 
proffered that the phrase “comes to the emergency department” in 
subsection (a) and the phrase “comes to a hospital” in subsection (b), 
create two separate and distinct duties for hospitals.179 Furthermore, the 
court reasoned that the statutory language of subsection (b) supports the 
disjunctive approach because it “mentions neither an emergency room 
locus nor a medical screening as a precursor to a hospital’s stabilization 
obligations. Rather, those obligations attach so long as an individual 
enters any part of the hospital and the hospital determines that an 
emergency medical condition exists.”180 
The Lopez-Soto court continued its analysis. The court stated, “a 
hospital more often than not will discover the existence of an emergency 
medical condition by performing the screening required under subsection 
(a)—but nothing in EMTALA’s language or structure makes subsection 
(b) an adjunct to subsection (a).”181 Moreover, the court reasoned, 
“punctuation can provide valuable insights into statutory 
interpretation,”182 and thus the court would not “overlook that Congress 
chose structurally to disconnect the three subsections, closing them off 
from each other by periods, without any conjunctive links.”183 
In support of its disjunctive approach, the First Circuit pointed to 
Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hospital.184 In Smith, the Virginia Supreme 
Court allowed a patient who did not present in the defendant hospital’s 
emergency room to nonetheless pursue an improper transfer claim under 
                                                                                                             
 178 Id. In this case, Ms. Lopez-Soto presented in the hospital’s emergency department 
in active labor. Id. at 171. The hospital staff took Ms. Lopez-Soto to the maternity ward, 
where she gave birth to her son. Id. The infant was born suffering from extreme 
respiratory distress. Id. The infant’s physician arranged for him to be transferred to 
another, more specialized facility. Id. However, the doctor then discovered the infant had 
an additional medical condition but chose to “send the infant to the receiving hospital 
without first attempting to stabilize the patient or to treat [the] exigent condition.”  Id. 
The baby was later admitted to the other hospital and died the next day. Id. 
 179 Id. at 173. 
 180 Id. at 174. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 174 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 183 Id. 
 184 See Smith v. Richmond Mem’l Hosp., 243 Va. 445, 452 (1992). In this case, the 
plaintiff’s mother presented in the defendant hospital’s emergency room in active labor, 
with a “premature rupture of the uterine membranes.”  Id. at 447. Several hours later, a 
physician, without examining her, ordered the plaintiff’s mother to be transferred to 
another hospital. Id. at 448. Two ambulance services refused to transfer her until the 
receiving hospital agreed to be billed for the service. Id. The plaintiff’s mother suffered 
substantial injuries and the infant had “cerebral palsy and is severely brain damaged.”  Id. 
The plaintiff’s mother sued the hospital on her child’s behalf, claiming a violation of 
EMTALA’s transfer provision. Id. 
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subsection (c).185 The Virginia court found “nothing in the language of 
the Act that limits application of [subsections (b) and (c)] solely to a 
patient who initially arrives at the emergency room.”186  This argument 
furthers the Lopez-Soto court’s approach because the Virginia court also 
refused to view EMTALA’s subsections (b) and (c) as one requirement, 
but instead, the Virginia court permitted a plaintiff to pursue an 
EMTALA claim after presenting outside of the emergency room.187 
Finally, the Lopez-Soto court drew on Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, 
Inc., a case where the Supreme Court rejected on textual grounds the 
Sixth Circuit’s importation of an intent requirement from subsection (a) 
into subsection (b).188 The First Circuit in Lopez-Soto, utilizing a similar 
textual approach, found that “subsection (b), unlike subsection (a), 
contains no requirement of entry through the portals of the emergency 
department. Thus, by analogy to Roberts, the plain language of the 
statute militates against importation of the ‘emergency department’ 
requirement from subsection (a) into subsection (b).”189 
Thus, the circuits remain split over how to read EMTALA’s three 
requirements of a medical screening requirement, stabilization, and 
transfer, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(c). While the Fourth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the conjunctive approach to treat 
EMTALA’s three provisions as interdependent and sequential 
requirements, the First Circuit, in contrast, follows the disjunctive 
approach, and interprets EMTALA as creating two distinct causes of 
action: one for the medical screening requirement and another for the 
stabilization requirement.190 
4. Broad Interpretations of EMTALA Liability 
Since EMTALA’s inception in the 1980s, there have been two key 
cases that have interpreted the statute broadly, and thus have expanded 
the possibilities for hospitals’ and physicians’ liability.191 In particular, 
Roberts v. Galen of Virginia., Inc. was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court addressed EMTALA, and by interpreting EMTALA and 
hospital liability broadly, the Court refused to import a motive 
requirement into the statute.192 Similarly, the First Circuit in Lopez-Soto 
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also interpreted EMTALA liability broadly by imposing the statute’s 
stabilization requirement on patients that present outside of a hospital’s 
emergency department.193 Both cases are key to understanding 
EMTALA’s interpretation among the circuits because of their 
broadening of hospitals’ and physicians’ liability. 
a. Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc. 
In 1999, the Supreme Court addressed EMTALA in Roberts, the 
first case in which the Court attempted to interpret EMTALA.194 In 
Roberts, both of the lower courts, including the Sixth Circuit, held that, 
“in order to recover in a suit alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
1395dd(b), a plaintiff must prove that the hospital acted with an 
‘improper motive’ in failing to stabilize her.”195 Because both of the 
courts found that the plaintiff was unable to prove such a motive, the 
defendant hospital prevailed.196 The Supreme Court, however, reversed 
and held that “section 1395dd(b) contains no express or implied 
‘improper motive’ requirement.”197 
The Roberts Court drew on another case, Cleland v. Bronson 
Health Care Group, Inc., in which the Sixth Circuit read EMTALA’s 
“appropriate medical screening” duty “as requiring a plaintiff to show an 
improper reason why he or she received ‘less than standard attention 
[upon arrival]. . . at the emergency room.’”198 The Court acknowledged 
that “there is no question that the text of section 1395dd(b), [the 
provision at issue in Roberts], does not require an ‘appropriate’ 
stabilization, [and furthermore, the stabilization provision cannot] . . . 
reasonably be read to require an improper motive.”199 
The Supreme Court expressly limited its holding in Roberts to 
eliminating the improper motive requirement from subsection (b)’s 
                                                                                                             
 193 Lopez-Soto, 175 F.3d at 170. 
 194 See Roberts, 525 U.S. at 249. In this case, the patient was taken to defendant 
hospital’s emergency room after being run over by a truck. Id. at 251. The patient had 
severe injuries to “her brain, spine, right leg, and pelvis.”  Id. The patient remained at that 
hospital in a volatile state for six weeks, and was then transferred to another facility. Id. 
The patient’s condition deteriorated rapidly after the transfer. Id. The patient’s guardian 
sued the hospital for violating EMTALA’s stabilization and transfer provisions. Id. at 
251–52. 
 195 Id. at 250. Improper motives include “indigency, race or sex of the patient.”  
Kamoie, supra note 26, at 37. 
 196 Roberts, 525 U.S. at 252. 
 197 Id. at 253. 
 198 Id. at 252 (quoting Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 
(6th Cir. 1990)). 
 199 Roberts, 525 U.S. at 253. 
174 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:149 
stabilization provision.200 The ruling is significant, however, because it 
“lowered the standard of proof required by plaintiffs, and will open the 
door to even more private EMTALA actions,”201 thereby furthering 
Congress’ intent of protecting patients on a wide-scale. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roberts is thus vital in broadening EMTALA’s reach, 
eliminating the need for a plaintiff to prove malice on the part of the 
hospital or physician, and refusing to limit the scope of the statute. 
b. Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek 
In 1999, the same year that the Supreme Court decided Roberts, the 
First Circuit interpreted EMTALA broadly by determining that the 
statute imposes liability on hospitals and physicians beyond the 
emergency room.202 The Lopez-Soto decision embodied the First 
Circuit’s disjunctive approach to EMTALA liability.203 The court’s 
decision imposed “the stabilization requirement on hospitals for any 
patient in an emergency medical condition, regardless of how that person 
enters the hospital or where within the walls of the hospital that person 
may be when the hospital identifies the problem.”204 Basing its decision 
both on the broad language of the stabilization requirement,205 as well as 
Congress’ intention to prevent patient dumping, the court reasoned that 
EMTALA’s medical screening requirement applies to patients who 
present in the emergency room, but the stabilization requirement applies 
to patients anywhere in the hospital.206 Thus, the First Circuit concluded 
that “the absence of emergency room presentment does not preclude 
prosecution.”207 
Despite Congress’ efforts to resolve the problem of patient 
dumping, EMTALA itself creates further legal issues. The circuit splits 
that resulted from courts’ differing interpretations of EMTALA, as well 
as the Roberts and Lopez-Soto decisions that broadened the scope of 
previous EMTALA liability, illustrate the judicial ambiguity that 
surrounds the statute. There is little consensus from the circuits as to the 
proper interpretation of EMTALA; thus, hospitals and physicians have 
little guidance as to their liability under the law. 
                                                                                                             
 200 See Kamoie, supra note 26, at 37. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 203 Id. 
 204 See Kamoie, supra note 26, at 39. 
 205 See Lopez-Soto, 175 F.3d at 173–74. 
 206 Id. at 173. 
 207 Id. at 177. 
2007] EMTALA: Protecting Patients First 175 
E. The Final Regulations to EMTALA 
“[T]he various interpretations throughout the circuits are evidence 
of the ambiguity surrounding the statute and the difficulty of arriving at 
one uniform interpretation.”208 In September 2003, the CMS published 
the Final Regulations in an attempt to clarify interpretations of 
EMTALA.209 The Final Regulations represent a revision of proposed 
regulations from May 2002, following a lengthy public comment 
process, and the CMS promulgated the regulations to clarify the specific 
obligations of hospitals and physicians under EMTALA.210 In particular, 
the Final Regulations address three divisive issues over which the 
circuits have split: (1) the medical screening requirement; (2) the 
conjunctive versus disjunctive approach; and (3) the application of 
EMTALA liability upon a patient’s admittance to the hospital.211 
1. EMTALA’s Medical Screening Requirement Does Not Impose 
an Objective Standard 
The Final Regulations attempt to clarify what EMTALA’s medical 
screening provision requires of a hospital.212 The Final Regulations, 
while refraining from “dictating what type of medical screening 
examination is required for each individual who presents to the dedicated 
emergency department,”213 proffer that the “screenings should be 
provided to each individual commensurate with the condition that is 
presented.”214 Furthermore, the Regulations state that “the extent of the 
necessary examination is generally within the judgment and discretion of 
the qualified medical personnel performing the examination.”215 The 
Final Regulations thus appear to promote a subjective standard for the 
medical screening requirement dependent on each individual patient’s 
condition, an interpretation that is in accordance with the majority of the 
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circuits.216 Moreover, the Regulations further match the majority of the 
circuits by stating that “EMTALA does not purport to establish a medical 
malpractice cause of action nor establish a national standard of care.”217 
2. EMTALA Protection Ends upon Admittance as an Inpatient 
The Final Regulations clearly state that “a hospital’s obligations 
under EMTALA end once an individual is admitted for inpatient care.”218 
The reasoning within the Regulations indicates that “should a hospital 
determine that it would be better to admit the individual as an inpatient, 
such a decision would not result in either a transfer or a discharge, and, 
consequently, the hospital would not have an obligation to stabilize 
under EMTALA.”219 However, the Regulations clarify that “a hospital 
cannot escape liability under EMTALA by ostensibly ‘admitting’ a 
patient, with no intention of treating the patient, then inappropriately 
transferring or discharging the patient without having met the 
stabilization requirement.”220 Thus, if a hospital does not “admit an 
individual in good faith with the intention of providing treatment (that is, 
the hospital used the inpatient admission as a means to avoid EMTALA 
requirements), then liability under EMTALA may attach.”221 The Final 
Regulations’ interpretation that EMTALA liability ends upon inpatient 
admittance is in agreement with the Ninth Circuit’s finding in Bryant.222 
3.  Both the Conjunctive and Disjunctive Approaches Are 
Supported by the Regulations 
The Final Regulations address and clarify the important issue 
concerning the point at which EMTALA liability arises. Specifically, the 
Final Regulations address the phrase “come to the hospital emergency 
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department” and purport that EMTALA liability is triggered in one of 
two ways: (1) “The individual can present at the hospital’s dedicated 
emergency department . . . and request examination or treatment for a 
medical condition;”223 or (2) “the individual can present elsewhere on 
hospital property . . . (that is, at a location that is on hospital property but 
is not part of a dedicated emergency department), and request 
examination or treatment for . . . an emergency medical condition.”224 
Therefore, the regulations can be interpreted to support both the 
conjunctive and disjunctive approaches. 
The Final Regulations’ interpretation of EMTALA extends liability 
to hospitals in accordance with the department where a patient first 
arrives, as well as with the condition in which that patient presents.225 
The conjunctive approach, with its threshold issue of whether an 
individual first presented in a hospital’s emergency department, finds 
support here, in the situation where a patient presents first to a hospital 
department other than the emergency department with a non-emergency 
condition. In that case, EMTALA liability would not apply. Similarly, 
the disjunctive approach draws support in the situation where a patient 
presents first in a non-emergency department but with an emergency 
condition. In that case, EMTALA liability would apply. Thus, insofar as 
the Final Regulations purport to clarify the ambiguities surrounding 
EMTALA and its interpretation by the circuits, the Regulations 
somewhat succeed here in clarifying the dispute over conjunctive versus 
disjunctive. 
The Final Regulations attempt to clarify the ambiguity surrounding 
EMTALA and its interpretation within the circuits. First, the Final 
Regulations state that EMTALA does not require an objectively 
reasonable medical screening requirement.226 Second, the Final 
Regulations state that EMTALA liability ends when a hospital admits a 
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patient.227 Finally, the Final Regulations lend support to both the 
conjunctive and disjunctive approaches to EMTALA liability.228 These 
interpretations, however, beg the question of whether the circuit courts 
must give deference to the Final Regulations. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Deference to the Final Regulations Under Chevron? 
Despite the release of the CMS’s Final Regulations, courts will still 
face issues of statutory interpretation regarding EMTALA. Courts will be 
challenged with the CMS’s interpretation of the statute. In such a case, a 
court’s interpretation will be guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.229 
Specifically, courts will need to determine whether they will give 
deference to the agency’s interpretation or whether they will choose to 
rely on the plain meaning of EMTALA and disregard the agency’s 
regulations as void.230 
Chevron is the definitive case on judicial review of agency-
promulgated regulations.231 In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that, 
unless Congress’ intent on the matter is entirely clear, courts must defer 
to an agency’s statutory interpretation, so long as such interpretation is 
permissible and reasonable.232 The Court identified a two-step inquiry 
that a court must follow when reviewing an agency’s construction of a 
statute.233 
First, the court must ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”234 To answer this question, the Chevron 
Court looked to both the plain language of the statute as well as the 
statute’s legislative history.235 At least one commentator has noted that, 
“[i]ncreasingly, the Supreme Court has chosen to resolve interpretive 
questions at Step One of the Chevron analysis . . . by using a textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation that finds in the statute itself an 
answer to the interpretive question posed.”236 When a court decides that 
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the statute speaks directly to the precise issue under consideration, “the 
court gives effect to the statute’s plain meaning, obviating any need to 
decide whether or not to defer to an administrative agency’s 
interpretation.”237 If Congress’ intent as to the meaning of the statute is 
clear, “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”238 
However, if “the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue,” the court must proceed to the second step 
of its inquiry.239 
Step two of the Chevron test requires a court to ask “whether the 
agency’s answer [to the question at issue] is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”240 The Chevron Court gave little affirmative 
instruction as to what constitutes a “permissible construction.”241 Rather, 
the Court stated that, as part of this analysis, a court “need not conclude 
that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have 
adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would 
have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial 
proceeding.”242 Thus, a court need not give deference to an agency’s 
interpretation if Congress’ intent is entirely clear.243 But, where 
Congress’ is not entirely clear, a court must defer to an agency’s 
statutory interpretation that is permissible.244 
1. Courts Should Give Chevron Deference to the Final Regulations’ 
Interpretation of EMTALA’s Medical Screening Requirement 
When faced with the issue of whether to give deference to the Final 
Regulations’ interpretation of EMTALA’s medical screening 
requirement, a court must follow step one of the Chevron analysis and 
determine first whether Congress spoke to that precise issue.245 The 
statutory text establishes a hospital’s responsibility to “provide for an 
appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the 
hospital’s emergency department . . . to determine whether or not an 
emergency medical condition . . . exists.”246 Instead of defining the exact 
parameters required of the medical screening exam, Congress uses the 
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ambiguous word “appropriate” to describe what it requires of 
hospitals.247 EMTALA’s other statutory language does little more to 
clarify this ambiguity.248 Thus, a court must turn then to the statute’s 
legislative history to ascertain Congress’ intent. 
As previously discussed, Congress’ intent in passing EMTALA was 
unmistakably clear—Congress intended first and foremost to prevent 
patient dumping.249 Chevron instructs that if Congress’ intent as to a 
particular question is clear, “that is the end of the matter,” and a 
reviewing court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”250  Thus, to the extent that the Final Regulations are in 
agreement with EMTALA’s objective and Congress’ intent in passing 
the statute, courts should give the Regulations Chevron deference.251 The 
Regulations articulate a subjective standard, requiring a medical 
screening be “provided to each individual commensurate with the 
condition that is presented.”252 Because this interpretation requires 
hospitals to tailor a patient’s screening examination in accordance with 
his medical conditions, as opposed to his financial or insurance status, in 
this circumstance, the Regulations deserve Chevron deference. 
Furthermore, because Congress’ intent is clear as to preventing hospitals 
from dumping patients, courts need not reach the second step in a 
Chevron analysis.253 
2. Courts Should Not Give Chevron Deference to the Final 
Regulations’ Interpretation that EMTALA Protection Ends Upon 
Admittance as an Inpatient 
Courts should not give Chevron deference to the Final Regulations’ 
interpretation that EMTALA protection ends upon admittance as an 
inpatient. Step one of the Chevron analysis requires a court to first 
determine whether Congress has spoken to the precise issue of whether 
EMTALA protection, and more specifically, its stabilization 
requirement, ends when a hospital admits an inpatient. A hospital 
triggers EMTALA’s stabilization requirement when a doctor determines 
that a patient is suffering from an emergency medical condition; if so, a 
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doctor must either stabilize the condition or transfer the patient, in 
accordance with EMTALA’s transfer requirements.254 Thus, if a hospital 
determines that no emergency condition exists, the hospital’s EMTALA 
obligations end after the hospital provides a patient with a nondisparate 
examination. Additionally, Congress defines the term “stabilize” only “in 
connection with the transfer of an emergency room patient.”255 
Nonetheless, the statute’s plain language is unclear as to whether the 
stabilization requirement attaches when a doctor initially stabilizes a 
patient and then admits her as an inpatient.256 
EMTALA’s legislative history clearly sets forth Congress’ intent in 
passing the statute. Specifically, the House Committee on Ways and 
Means reported: 
The Committee is greatly concerned about the increasing number 
of reports that hospital emergency rooms are refusing to accept or 
treat patients with emergency conditions if the patient does not 
have medical insurance. . . . The Committee wants to provide a 
strong assurance that pressures for greater hospital efficiency are 
not to be construed as license to ignore traditional responsibilities 
and loosen historic standards.257 
In addition, the House Judiciary Committee, which had considered 
EMTALA’s enforcement mechanisms, observed generally: 
In recent years there has been a growing concern about the 
provision of adequate emergency room medical services to 
individuals who seek care, particularly as to the indigent and 
uninsured. Although at least twenty-two states have enacted 
statutes or issued regulations requiring the provision of limited 
medical services whenever an emergency situation exists, and 
despite the fact that many state court rulings impose a common 
law duty on doctors and hospitals to provide necessary 
emergency care, some are convinced that the problem needs to be 
addressed by federal sanctions . . . . The Judiciary Committee 
shares the concern of the Ways and Means Committee that 
appropriate emergency room care be provided to patients faced 
with medical emergencies and in active labor.258 
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Although one could argue that Congress repeatedly used the term 
“emergency room” to indicate that treatment need not extend to patients 
outside of the predetermined emergency department, “[a] fairer reading 
is that Congress sought to insure that patients with medical emergencies 
would receive emergency care.”259 Furthermore, “[a]though emergency 
care often occurs, and almost invariably begins, in an emergency room, 
emergency care does not always stop when a patient is wheeled from the 
emergency room into the main hospital.”260 
To immunize hospitals from EMTALA liability merely because 
hospital personnel move patients from the emergency room to another 
department would, therefore, be incongruous with Congress’ clearly-
stated intent to protect patients from hospitals transferring or dumping 
them before they are stabilized. If hospitals admit patients in order to 
treat them fairly and in accordance with standard procedures, the 
attachment of EMTALA’s requirements will not be problematic for 
hospitals. Only hospitals seeking to avoid EMTALA’s basic 
requirements by dumping patients before stabilization would fear 
liability attaching after admittance. In either case, Congress’ stated intent 
to protect patients demands that the stabilization requirement remain in 
effect even after doctors admit patients as inpatients. Thus, a hospital 
“may not circumvent the requirements of the Act merely by admitting an 
emergency room patient to the hospital, then immediately discharging 
that patient.”261 Instead, “[e]mergency care must be given until the 
patient’s emergency medical condition is stabilized.”262 
Nonetheless, the Final Regulations state that EMTALA liability 
ends upon a patient’s admittance as an inpatient. Because Congress’ 
intent is clear as to protecting patients even after initial stabilization and 
admittance, courts need not accord Chevron deference to the Final 
Regulations. Instead, courts should consider the Final Regulations void 
to the extent they limit liability under EMTALA when hospitals admit 
patients as inpatients. 
3. Courts Should Not Give Chevron Deference to the Final 
Regulations in Relation to the Conjunctive Versus Disjunctive 
Approaches 
Courts should not give Chevron deference to the Final Regulations 
in relation to the conjunctive versus disjunctive approaches. Here, the 
first step of the Chevron analysis requires a court to determine if 
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Congress has addressed this precise issue: whether courts should 
consider the three requirements of EMTALA in the conjunctive, meaning 
that the provisions are read as interdependent and sequential, or whether 
courts should consider EMTALA’s provisions in the disjunctive, such 
that courts would read the medical screening and stabilization 
requirements as separate causes of action. 263 EMTALA’s language lends 
itself to the disjunctive approach for several reasons.264 
First, the medical screening requirement in subsection (a) attaches 
when a patient “comes to the emergency room,” while the stabilization 
requirement in subsection (b) is triggered when a patient “comes to the 
hospital.”265 If Congress had intended to make these two requirements 
the same, and thus trigger EMTALA only when a plaintiff meets both 
requirements, it would have drafted the statute to reflect such a desire. 
However, EMTALA’s plain language reflects Congress’ intent to create 
two separate causes of action: one for the medical screening 
examination, and another for the stabilization requirement. Moreover, 
nowhere in subsections (b) or (c) does Congress mention a requirement 
that a patient present first in an emergency room in order for EMTALA 
liability to attach.266 Furthermore, by including women in active labor 
within the gambit of EMTALA’s protection, “Congress obviously had a 
horizon broader than the emergency room in mind,”267 as most women 
are admitted to maternity wards, rather than emergency rooms, when 
they present in active labor.268 
In addition, the adoption of the disjunctive approach to EMTALA 
interpretation unequivocally furthers Congress’ intent to prevent patient 
dumping. As the Lopez-Soto court reasoned, 
After all, patient dumping is not a practice that is limited to 
emergency rooms. If a hospital determines that a patient on a 
ward has developed an emergency medical condition, it may fear 
that the costs of treatment will outstrip the patient’s resources, 
and seek to move the patient elsewhere. That strain of patient 
dumping is equally as pernicious as what occurs in emergency 
departments, and we are unprepared to say that Congress did not 
seek to curb it.269 
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Because EMTALA’s plain language and its legislative history both 
clearly reflect Congress’ intent to prevent patient dumping, courts should 
not afford Chevron deference to the Final Regulations, insofar as the 
Regulations construe EMTALA liability conjunctively. Thus, the Final 
Regulations requirement that a patient who presents on hospital property 
apart from a dedicated emergency department must “request examination 
or treatment for an emergency medical condition”270 in order for 
EMTALA protection to attach, is void. Furthermore, courts need not 
continue to the second step in a Chevron analysis here because Congress’ 
intent and the statute’s plain language is unambiguous as to support 
EMTALA’s interpretation in the disjunctive. 
Thus, courts facing an EMTALA issue today will have one of two 
possible results. If a court encounters an issue concerning the medical 
screening requirement, the court should give Chevron deference to the 
Final Regulations’ interpretation of EMTALA’s medical screening 
requirement. In contrast, however, courts should not give Chevron 
deference to either the interpretation within the Final Regulations that 
EMTALA protection ends upon admittance as an inpatient nor to the 
Regulations’ interpretation with regard to the conjunctive versus 
disjunctive approach. 
B. Mr. Takewell’s Case Today 
If Mr. Takewell presented in the Tennessee hospital today, his 
treatment would have been decidedly different. EMTALA would have 
required the hospital to tailor Mr. Takewell’s screening examination in 
accordance with his medical conditions, as opposed to his inability to 
pay. In other words, the hospital would have been required to assess his 
medical state, and likely would have discovered that he was in an 
emergency condition. Then, EMTALA would have mandated that the 
hospital stabilize Mr. Takewell’s condition. If Mr. Takewell’s doctor had 
followed the same course of action of removing him from his bed and 
carrying him out of the hospital without treatment, the doctor and the 
hospital would have faced statutory penalties, including fines, exclusion 
from the Medicare program, and possible civil liability. Furthermore, as 
this comment suggests, even if the Tennessee hospital admitted Mr. 
Takewell as an inpatient, the hospital still would face statutory liability 
under EMTALA. Moreover, this comment suggests that Mr. Takewell 
                                                                                                             
 270 Medicare Program, Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of 
Medicare-Participating Hospitals in Treating Individuals With Emergency Medical 
Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg. 53222, 53243 (Sept. 9. 2003) (codified at 42 C.F.R. Parts 413, 
482, and 489) (emphasis added). 
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should have an EMTALA claim no matter where he presented in the 
hospital—the emergency department or otherwise. 
Thus, Mr. Takewell would have fared much better had he fallen ill 
today as opposed to when he did in 1986. Not only would EMTALA and 
the Final Regulations now require the Tennessee hospital to assess and 
stabilize his emergency condition, but the statute, notwithstanding the 
issuance of the Final Regulations, would also protect Mr. Takewell, 
regardless of where he presented in the hospital. Unfortunately for Mr. 
Takewell and other indigent patients in similar situations, the benefit of 
EMTALA arrived too late. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted EMTALA to protect patients in need of 
emergency medical care from doctors and hospitals that turn away such 
patients because of their inability to pay for treatment. Inconsistent 
judicial interpretations evidence the need for clarification of the statute. 
In particular the divisive issues over which the circuits have split 
highlight the need for a uniform ruling by the Supreme Court. Courts 
should give deference to the Final Regulations’ interpretation of 
EMTALA’s medical screening requirement.  Courts, however, should 
not give Chevron deference to the CMS’s Final Regulations to the extent 
that the Regulations conflict with Congress’ intent to prevent patient 
dumping. Therefore, courts should not defer to either the Final 
Regulations’ interpretation that EMTALA protection ends upon 
admittance as an inpatient nor to the Regulations’ view in regards to the 
conjunctive versus the disjunctive approach. Additionally, although 
courts faced with EMTALA will need to conduct a Chevron analysis for 
each specific statutory issue, courts should look to Congress’ intent and 
interpret the statute and its purpose broadly. Finally, courts should adhere 
to Congress’ intent, and strive to protect patients like Mr. Takewell first. 
 
